A Comparative Study of Allameh Tabataba’i’s and Ayatollah Javadi Amoli’s Views on Bodily Resurrection

Abstract

Bodily resurrection, as one of the most fundamental theological and philosophical issues in Islam, possesses considerable epistemological and identity-related significance within the system of Transcendent Theosophy. Adopting a comparative approach, this article offers a novel analysis of the fundamental differences between two major perspectives in contemporary Islamic philosophy. Drawing on the doctrine of substantial motion, Allameh Tabataba’i regards bodily resurrection as the outcome of the body’s ontological perfection and the union of the soul with the imaginal body. In his view, the otherworldly body constitutes an intensifying continuation of the worldly body; while preserving personal identity, it lacks material identity and derives its nature from its relation to the soul and the unity of the individual soul. He rejects the return of the elemental body and develops his philosophical explanation through an analysis of Qur’anic verses concerning resurrection and responses to related objections. Ayatollah Javadi Amoli, by contrast, emphasizes the principle of the embodiment of deeds and acknowledges the connection between the identity of the otherworldly body and a person’s acquired dispositions and actions. He considers the resurrected body to be a concrete manifestation of one’s deeds—a body that is not a repetition of the natural body but a reality proportionate to the soul’s ontological journey. Through an analysis of primary sources, this study demonstrates that although the two approaches share certain foundational principles, they exhibit profound philosophical and exegetical differences concerning the manner of the union between the body and the soul and the relationship between the otherworldly and worldly bodies. Understanding these differences is essential for addressing contemporary challenges in the philosophy of religion.