The Role of the Peace Court and the Dispute Resolution Council in Interpreting and Communicating the Concept of “Mā Lā Yuṭīqūn” in the Hadith of Rafʿ
Keywords:
Hadith of Rafʿ, Mā Lā Yuṭīqūn, Peace Court, Dispute Resolution Council, Reconciliation, Tolerable Justice, Imami JurisprudenceAbstract
This study aims to analyze the role of the Peace Court and the Dispute Resolution Council in interpreting and communicating the concept of “mā lā yuṭīqūn” in the Hadith of Rafʿ. The main problem addressed in the article is how the judicial system, while preserving individual rights and enforcing binding legal rules, can prevent the imposition of duties, obligations, or procedures that exceed a person’s real and customary capacity. The Hadith of Rafʿ, particularly the phrase “mā lā yuṭīqūn,” constitutes an important foundation in Imami jurisprudence for negating obligation in matters beyond human endurance and can also provide an analytical basis for judicial procedure, reconciliation, settlement, and legal responsibility. Using a descriptive-analytical method and relying on jurisprudential, legal-theoretical, and legal sources, the article shows that the Peace Court and the Dispute Resolution Council are not merely administrative mechanisms for reducing caseloads; rather, they can serve as institutional grounds for realizing humane, tolerable, and peace-oriented justice. The Peace Court, while maintaining its judicial authority, can play a significant role in identifying genuine incapacity, adjusting methods of enforcing obligations, reducing burdensome formalities, and issuing proportionate decisions. The Dispute Resolution Council, through dialogue, mediation, and reconciliation, can communicate the meaning of incapacity to disputing parties and guide them toward informed, fair, and enforceable agreements. The findings indicate that “mā lā yuṭīqūn” does not mean the absolute negation of responsibility; instead, it functions as a criterion for regulating responsibility according to the actual capacity of individuals. The study concludes that these two institutions, if they carefully distinguish genuine excuse from artificial claims of inability, can establish a balance between protecting rights, ensuring fairness, and preventing unbearable legal burdens.
Downloads
Downloads
Published
Submitted
Revised
Accepted
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2026 Raziyeh Movahedi

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.