A Comparative Analysis and Critique of the Foundations of Commands and Prohibitions in Imami and Wahhabi Legal Theory

Abstract

The discussion of commands and prohibitions constitutes one of the most fundamental and influential areas of Islamic legal theory, playing a decisive role in the process of deriving Islamic legal rulings and in the formation of jurisprudential disagreements among Islamic schools of law. Disagreements concerning whether the imperative form denotes obligation or recommendation, whether commands require immediate or delayed compliance, and the relationship between prohibition, prescriptive unlawfulness, and the invalidity of legal acts are among the principal issues in which divergent legal-theoretical interpretations have produced distinct and, at times, conflicting jurisprudential outcomes. These disagreements have not remained confined to the theoretical level; rather, they have generated extensive practical consequences for legal opinions, the religious conduct of legally responsible individuals, and the treatment of emerging issues in Islamic jurisprudence. In this context, Wahhabi jurisprudence and legal theory, through their particular emphasis on the apparent meaning of scriptural texts and adherence to the understanding of the early generations of Muslims, have adopted a relatively textualist and restrictive approach to the analysis of commands and prohibitions. This approach is clearly evident in the works of thinkers such as Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn al-Qayyim. By contrast, Imami legal theory, drawing on reason, customary contextual indicators, the context of legal discourse, and consideration of the objectives of Islamic law, offers a rational and analytical approach to interpreting commands and prohibitions. The principal problem addressed in this study is the elucidation of the epistemological and methodological foundations of commands and prohibitions in Wahhabi legal theory and their critique in light of the accepted principles of Imami legal theory. The article aims to comparatively analyze these two approaches and identify the roots of their disagreements concerning the implications of imperative and prohibitive forms and the jurisprudential consequences arising from them. The study employs a descriptive–analytical method with a comparative approach, and its data have been collected from authoritative works of Islamic legal theory representing both traditions. The findings indicate that the predominance of literalist textual interpretation and the restriction of the role of reason in Wahhabi legal theory, as opposed to the reason-centered and context-sensitive approach of the Imami tradition, have produced fundamental differences in the interpretation of commands and prohibitions and in their practical jurisprudential consequences.