The Problem of Evil in the Thought of Allama Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Tabataba'i and Alvin Plantinga (A Comparative and Analytical Study)

Abstract

The problem of evil is one of the most complex and challenging issues in the philosophy of religion, typically articulated in two principal formulations: the logical problem of evil, which claims a logical incompatibility between the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good God and the existence of evil; and the evidential problem of evil, which considers the existence of evil as probabilistic evidence against belief in God. The present study, employing a descriptive–analytical method with a comparative approach, examines the perspectives of two prominent thinkers: Allama Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Tabataba'i, a major Islamic philosopher and exegete, and Alvin Plantinga, a contemporary Christian analytic philosopher. Within the framework of Transcendent Philosophy, Tabataba'i interprets evils as privative, relative, and necessary features of the order of creation, and offers a theodicy-oriented response grounded in the principle of the best possible order and the theory of posited cognitions. Plantinga, adopting an analytic philosophical approach, advances the Free Will Defense, aiming solely to demonstrate the logical compatibility between the existence of God and the existence of evil, without claiming to provide an actual justification. The findings indicate that despite profound methodological and foundational differences, both thinkers converge in defending theism; however, Tabataba'i adopts an ontological–theodicean approach, whereas Plantinga employs a logical–defensive framework.