The Correlation Between the Rationality of Ethical Propositions and Customary Approval from Avicenna’s Perspective

Abstract

The analysis of ethical propositions from the perspective of Avicenna demonstrates that morality is not merely subordinate to theoretical reason but also relies upon social acceptance and customary recognition. The necessity of this study arises from the fact that a precise understanding of the relationship between rationality and custom makes it possible to clarify both the practical and theoretical status of ethics and contributes to explaining the relationship among reason, will, and moral action. Using a descriptive–analytical method, this research examines Avicenna’s principal philosophical works, including Al-Isharat wa al-Tanbihat and Al-Shifa’, and extracts his views concerning virtues and vices, ethical common opinions (mashhurat), the principle of moderation, and the role of theoretical and practical reason in determining the truth or falsity of propositions. The findings indicate that, according to Avicenna, ethical propositions possess truth-value while simultaneously requiring social acceptance in order to become effective within moral practice. Accordingly, theoretical reason and demonstrative proof secure the truth and correspondence of ethical propositions to reality, whereas custom and public approval provide the conditions necessary for their practical realization and application. These findings highlight the significance of the inseparable relationship between rationality and customary validation in Avicenna’s ethical system and present an intermediary framework reconciling moral realism with the functional role of social convention.